Insights from Our Advisory Board Members: William Lippert.

William Lippert is a career intelligence analyst, having worked first for the US Department of Defense and then for INTERPOL. He graduated from American and Georgetown Universities in Washington, DC, with a bachelors and masters in international relations and security, and then after having worked in Washington, DC, he worked in Lyon, France and then Singapore. He is currently working on a PhD at Leiden University, focusing on conventional arms control in Europe. He has published several recent articles in peer-reviewed, academic journals, and expects to receive his doctorate before mid-2025.

William has taught law enforcement officials extensively on crime analysis as a general skill and discipline, as well as analysis of crime areas such as organized crime and terrorism. He has extensive skills with criminal database development and design, as well as crime analysis software such as i2 iBase and Analyst Notebook. Thanks to his work at INTERPOL, he has had to conceive of crime threats from a very global perspective.

He is a proud and enthusiastic Advisory Board member for the Protective Intelligence Network in Singapore.

In the following text, he offers an analysis of threats to the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics.

Crime Threats to the Paris 2024 Olympics

Participants, organizers, and spectators at the Paris, France, 2024 Olympics may face an unprecedented range and variety of threats compared to most other international sporting events in the past twenty years, although the severity may not be as extreme as the five to ten years due to the Islamic State’s (IS’s) reduced frequency and intensity of attacks outside of the Middle East.

Threats to sporting events come in at least three main forms: organized crime, public disorder, and terrorism. Organized crime (OC) threats may target unsuspecting tourists and spectators for opportunistic crimes such as fraud and pickpocketing, or target the games themselves through activities such as illegal doping, illegal gambling, and match fixing. The good news in this area is that the Paris games are only slightly more vulnerable than any other Olympics – with two factors possibly increasing the threat. The first is that the games are in Paris itself – which means that there are already many OC groups present and familiar with the city.

The public order threat, however, is exceptionally high – whether it is in the form of mass protests or smaller, disruptive activities such as interfering with sporting events by trespassing on sport event areas or even attacking athletes. France’s recent elections may inspire domestic protesters dissatisfied with outcomes. These protesters may not oppose the games per se, but may seek a large audience. Violent protests targeting French policies directed at the Olympics would not be out of place in a country that has a reputation for being the scene of frequent mass protests and strikes, some of which descend into disorder and violence.

The second is that Paris is a very accessible city – falling within the Schengen zone and in a country with a large number of visa waivers. One might contrast this with, for example, if the games were in Singapore which has a much lower incidence of OC activity; and a country such as Russia which has much fewer visa-free travel agreements that would make entry of criminals easy.

Yet there are some events today which may especially inspire public disorder protests.

First, the Israeli-Gaza conflict continues to inflame passions and has inspired large numbers of people to engage in public disorder to express their support for Gazans. The Olympics would be prime opportunity for anti-Israel protests due to the visibility of any disruption. Similarly, climate activists might use the global attention on the Olympics to continue to publicly, and disruptively, press their case for carbon emissions reductions to combat climate change.

Terror threats are more difficult to anticipate, because terror attacks happen in places where they are predictable because of their frequency – such as in Baghdad or Kabul in the recent past – or they may occur in places that have never experienced a terror attack. The latter could be the result of a new cause or issue having arisen, because a target of opportunity presents itself where it otherwise is not present (an international sports team may be an example), or because security had succeeded in the past in preventing attacks.

Attacks maybe of any scale and tactic – from a small, homemade explosive device, to a stabbing, to a large-scale event such as a massive vehicle attack, large bomb, or multiple-shooter attack...

France has experienced all of these in the past few decades. Here again the Israeli-Gaza war is of paramount concern, **with persons and states viewing Israel and its supporting states as legitimate targets. **

An additional challenge that the Paris games face is that it is the first Olympics since the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War began. Aside from protests (mostly) targeting Russian athletes, Russian or Ukrainian athletes could be the target of violence – with the latter potentially subject to state-sponsored, covert attacks in line with recent spates of assassinations and sabotage throughout Europe reportedly orchestrated by the Kremlin.

Another substantial threat arises from weapon leakage from the conflict. Weapons from the 1990’s Balkan Wars spread throughout Europe, serving as tools for OC groups (often Balkan based). These were especially useful for armed robberies.

There are no reliable statistics or public assessments – but it is possible that quantity of loose weapons and ammunition from the Russo-Ukraine War could exceed those of the Balkans conflicts by far, as the scale both geographically, in terms of personnel engaged, munitions expended, equipment employed, and other measures is far greater today compared to the 1990’s. Thus, the same percentage of items leak from the Russo-Ukraine War as the Balkan War, we may see a much greater number of illicit market weapons.

These could bedevil the Olympics in many ways: armed robbery of cash-carrying vehicles, terrorism, kidnapping, armed robbery of luxury jewelry stores, and gang violence.

The challenge for the Olympics is that with 206 nations competing, there are no lack of reasons for protesters or terrorists to attack.

Incidents may not target France in any way; a protestor or terrorist may target any of the 206 national teams for purely domestic and internationally unknown reasons due to opportunity and the desire to draw attention.

The good news is that the French government is likely well prepared. It has had to confront terrorism and serious organized crime threats for decades if not more.

ISIS has committed several high-profile attacks against the country. Paris is unlikely to lack vigilance – although there are some challenges fundamental to the Olympics which can complicate prevention. First, the games are by nature public events.

The goal is to have more rather than less spectators – let alone supporting staff, organizers, businesses, and others involved at some level. There is no “high security” area outside of limited events such as the opening and closing ceremonies. Large crowds will gather and expected and unexpected areas. Second, the games are spread out throughout the city – with some competitions taking place in other cities, reducing the authorities’ ability to concentrate resources in a single, distinct area.

The Olympics are regular events – and from a security perspective have similarities with other major sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup and EUFA football championships. However, there are a few factors that are particular to this Olympics.

Some level of crime is inevitable, but one hopes that preparation and international cooperation will suppress an uncontrollable spate of OC, and prevent any major terror attack.

William Lippert